Capital Markets Union and the notion of a federal European Union
The free movement of capital within the European Union, as prescribed by articles 63 to 66 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, is a broad endeavor; it can probably be best described as one, overarching, all-encompassing, provision. Even if there are doubts about the legal provisions of its breadth of application, everyone can agree on the tremendous difficulties in achieving the enforcement of this freedom beyond the mere principle. Crafting such a freedom demands types of legal harmonisation, translated into expectations, and requirements concerning all activities relevant to the movement of capital across all member-states. I More importantly, as an exhaustive principle, establishing the free movement of capital for citizens of the European Union demands, from every member-state, the type of union-wide imposed harmonisation that encroaches on their ability to regulate their own sphere of competences.
Within the organisation of constitutional powers amongst member-states, demanding a freedom of capital flows implies a high (the highest?) level of legal and political integration in economic and related policy areas. In short, a full liberalisation of capital movements within Member States, as introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, goes much further than the mere expectation that member-states simply remove restrictions to the extent necessary for the functioning of the common market. But this desired end goal has already involved, and will involve many more, intermediate steps.
As economic and political circumstances gradually changed, globally and in Europe, the stage became set, step by step, for the realisation of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). At this time, EMU exists in practice (as several steps have been taken towards more coordination of national economic and monetary policies), II but only in part. Its full realisation is currently a matter of theory and legislative intent. In this movement towards free movement of capital, built upon the notion of free movement of goods and services, a common EU capital market, III/IV is, both in name and in practice, a necessary element to achieve the concept of a European Single Market (of goods and services). E -106 the EU, different economic zones present differing demands in terms of these policies, and, within the EMU, a balancing act is difficult to achieve. In fact, considering current circumstances, such as Euro related interest rates close to zero, and the impossibility of using expansive fiscal policies due to the frail economic situations of most member-states, little can be done in the field of monetary policies in order to appease to everyone involved. Instead, the focus must be placed on deepening structural reforms that overhaul the functioning of the market in order to make it more amenable to investors, and competitive in comparison to that offered by third party states. In this regard, the Capital Markets Union (CMU) can be understood as one of the possible answers to these limitations (Fernández 2016: 4-5) .
The idea of the CMU immediately calls to mind another EU legislative project, now a reality, the European Banking Union. Launched in 2010, the initiative aimed to provide a three-pillar answer to systemic risk posed to banks within the European Union (especially due to the state debt they held).
VI If we were to compare the Unions (European Banking and Capital Markets), it is possible to argue that the CMU will not involve a profound change to financial markets in the short-term. But, although there are no significant changes to the overall organisation and functioning of the system, its implications are more pervasive, and long-term focused.
Instead of trying to alter the relevant framework, the CMU entails considerable expectations of harmonisation, and more efficient rules being implemented, with the aim of establishing firm foundations for the development of EU capital markets and the diversification of the sources of financing available to EU companies. Still, the CMU's scope is larger as its provisions are applicable to all member-states, whereas the European Banking Union is only implemented in member-states that have the Euro as their currency. VII Hence, we can conclude that the CMU boasts a distinct end from that of the European Banking Union. Where one aimed to centralise the banking policy framework, providing an adequate supervisory system (Véron 2014: 4-5), VIII the other seems not to be so intent on a movement towards centralisation, instead leaning towards a diverse set of objectives for development. IX This broader scope is also visible in the fact that there are no indications of a supervising body for CMU implementation being established. That decision seems to be rooted in the fact that, as we will see, the CMU implies a change in a 
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heterogeneous group of subjects, with considerably different expectations of harmonisation in each one.
Free movement of capital and capital market development
Achieving the free movement of capital, and capital market development, does not represent a truly new objective for the EU. In fact, a common market for capital was one of the goals of the Treaty of Rome, where it was one of the tenets of ever advancing to remove all the barriers and blockages that prevent cross-border investment within the European Union, aiming to ensure the goal of free movement of capital through several initiatives that would be put under the umbrella of a "Capital Markets Union". Progress on that front has been relatively swift, with the publication of a Green Paper on "Building a Capital Markets Union" in February of 2015, XI after which the Council adopted conclusions on this initiative, XII prompting the Commission to launch its Action Plan on September 30th 2015. XIII The Commission's position, according to the Action Plan, was that a CMU would mobilise capital and channel it to companies and infrastructure projects, by allowing for different funding sources all across Europe. This would lead to increased cross-border risk-sharing and more liquid markets, which would deepen financial integration, lower costs and increase European competitiveness.
As investors' confidence and trust in capital markets was felt to have been reestablished at the time, the objective was now to increase capital markets' efficiency and its ability to provide financing to European companies. Since then, a more complete set of goals has been put in place to create deeper, more integrated capital markets across the EU, which, in turn, should lower costs for investors and enhance market resiliency.
A financial system is comprised of a set of institutions and markets that allow for certain contracts and services, that then make it possible for economic agents to desynchronise both their risks and the time when those risks manifest. Within a fully 
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implemented CMU, cost of capital would tend to be equal throughout the EU, facilitating or promoting investment market value for all relevant dimensions of activity (investment funds, SME funding, long term investment -i.e. infrastructure projects -and many others), as member-state borders would become mostly irrelevant in terms of investors' choices.
Capital could then flow between states with reduced intervention by financial intermediaries or service providers in general. In fact, amongst other aims, a CMU would empower investors to provide significant funds for investment across the Single Market without any barriers.
At the time the CMU was proposed (and, as it seems, at the time of writing), the financial system of EU member-states was thought to be overly reliant on bank financing for companies (Véron, Wolff 2016: 131-132  Facilitating cross-border investing: XXXII Namely by harmonising relevant civil law and fiscal law provisions to promote, as much as possible, cross-border commercialisation of investment funds, as well as reducing (eliminating) crossborder fees. On this subject, relevant progress has been made, for example, in terms of promoting the harmonisation of insolvency law across the EU.
XXXIII
While these objectives and indicators are interesting tools and relevant benchmarks, one must mention that they are not clear-cut, as European capital markets are subject to several other factors, the effects of which cannot be removed from these, or any other, indicators.
While economic activity demands, for example, the existence of commerce, capital markets are, in fact, not a necessary part of economic activity. Economies can make do with alternatives to provide funding; banks, for example, can act as intermediaries replacing the need for capital markets. Their concern, linking borrowers and lenders, makes capital markets competitive and impersonal (whereas banking might be based on mutual trust between the parties). Investment in capital markets occurs only when it is advantageous for investors. This means that fostering capital market development, while desirable, XXXIV must stem from agreeable market conditions and legislative initiatives, which ensure their attractiveness. Otherwise, they will be underdeveloped and not sufficiently liquid;
prerequisites that, in turn, must be accompanied by a regulatory and supervisory framework under which financial stability risks are under control. 
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In considering the importance of securities law in general as the plethora of legal rules that govern and conduct capital markets, for example outlining the requirements that must be met for firms to access investors and raise money, we must also consider that evolving technology has created new possibilities in the functioning of capital markets, namely generating global liquidity. If a certain jurisdiction imposes onerous regulatory costs on access to capital markets, firms might simply make investments available elsewhere and investors might simply choose to invest somewhere else. Due to this global liquidity, those decisions would mean, in themselves, that investment simply would not take place in the markets that are less attractive, XXXV losing to others that are more appealing.
Risk-sharing and the implementation of the Capital Markets Union
The implementation of the CMU project is one of the clearest examples of federal implications within the framework constituted by the juridical entities of the European Union, with several elements, characteristic of federalism, being deeply ingrained in the framework. One of the greatest challenges in working towards a CMU is the regulatory aspect. There is a tremendous diversity of non-bank finance legislation across EU member states. As we know, EU law takes precedence over national legal orders and member-states' courts; administrative authorities must ensure that national law does not conflict with its provisions. XXXVI This means that a top down approach, such as the one being implemented, is possible given existing Treaty provisions. Nonetheless, regulation of CMU requires justification on how it would benefit the Union as a whole.
Capital markets integration, or financial integration in general, has the relative advantage of supporting risk-sharing between strong and weak sections of the entity. In the case of the EU, this means that the risk-sharing (here in the sense of smoothing of consumption) XXXVII between countries counterbalances risks that are specific to each part of the whole. In other words, it increases the union's welfare by hedging state-specific risks within the totality of member-states. In the EMU and, in particular, in the euro area, a single monetary policy is unable to react to asymmetric shocks (problems arising in certain portions of the EU when other portions are having no difficulties due to disjointed business cycles). This means that risk-sharing is key in mitigating the effects of those shocks. If consumption can be, and is, positively influenced due to the existence of risksharing mechanisms (for example, robust market or fiscal mechanisms), the overall E -112 volatility of aggregate consumption is also reduced, providing the welfare gains as discussed. This applies not only to countries ultimately affected by shocks, but to all of the EU, as any macroeconomic adjustments required to compensate for the effects of the shock are not as brutal.
When considering this mechanism of risk-sharing, the case of the EU is special. Labour mobility, for example, is possible, but made harder by the existence of different languages within the EU. A tax system at the supranational level is also unrealistic at this point of time, at least from a political point of view. Furthermore, limits on fiscal deficits XXXVIII also limit member-state governments in their attempts to smooth large shocks. In fact, as Furceri and Zdzienicka (2013: 16-17) , risk-sharing mechanisms in the euro area appear to have been particularly ineffective during financial crises and severe downturns, significantly less so than in other federations.
As Vitor Constâncio puts it:
"Ideally, the CMU should achieve As long as the principle of equal treatment of users across member-states is respected, a CMU aimed at developing European capital markets is one of the few cross-state risksharing mechanisms that can be used by the EU.
A testing ground for supervisory convergence
In the EU, supervision of banking, insurance and securities markets is characterised by a multi-layered system of authorities organised by both sectoral area and level (European or national) of supervision and regulation. This layered structure demands the existence of properly enacted and applied by the agents of a united EU financial system, without significant differences between them. In conclusion, by analysing the legal framework that attempts to bridge the CMU, one finds a scenario fraught with a sense of overarching control and centralisation that must be deemed characteristic of a federalist approach to regulation.
What about Brexit?
Despite the looming Brexit, it seemed clear that no other country could expect benefits from the CMU greater than those in store for the UK's financial industry; the UK hosts Europe's largest capital markets. L Assuming, as seems more and more probable at the time of writing, that the UK will be denied access to the European Single Market, British capital markets will not be part of the CMU. This means that the most established fund management location, the city of London, would be out of the equation, and different prime capital markets hubs have to be found (Stander 2016: 5-7).
LI
In the absence of the UK, already on a path to leaving the European Union, the remaining member states face a rather different cost-benefit allocation among them. As Philip Stander notes, on the one hand several financial centers could benefit from a relocation of UK-based firms and activities and, on the other, member states would have to compensate for the loss of market depth to cushion the economic consequences on capital market funding (Stander, 2016: 6-10) . The consequences of Brexit on the CMU project are dependent on future political decisions, and hinge on whether (i) the EU decides to accelerate its efforts to implement the CMU to counter the absence of the UK,
(ii) the EU feels that the project is not warranted as much attention due to the absence of the UK or, even, (iii) whether Brexit negotiations allow for a deal to be struck where the UK's financial industry retains the ability to obtain "passports" for their firms to perform financial services within the EU. All signs point, quite clearly, to the first hypothesis.
LII
Taking into account the consultation on the CMU back in 2015, LIII discussed above, the remaining member-states stance concerning the CMU can be categorised in three groups. 
The current implementation of the Capital Markets Union
The CMU was originally based on an implementation framework spread over several years, and already in motion (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) 
Closing remarks and challenges yet to be addressed
The poor development of EU capital markets has determined that EU companies have a greater dependence on bank financing than would be ideal, LXII a problem which prompted, in part, the project of creating the CMU. This initiative is important and necessary, but for European companies to reap the benefits can only work if all elements of the equation are assessed.
Alongside a reimagined Economic and Monetary Union, all the synchronous movements enacted into law towards harmonisation and capital flows within EU capital markets show us that the CMU is an fundamental element in the movement towards ever greater integration in terms of economic governance and economic policies in general.
However, this integration is not free from difficulties, not the least of them the challenges of coping with ever greater European legal requirements that in time will come to supersede almost all manifestations of regulation by member-states. This ongoing economic and financial integration could be limited by the protection of constitutional principles at a national level, ensuring that the federal construct does not become so overbearing that it turns pernicious in nature. 
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The distinctive characteristics of each member-state suggest that the effects of the CMU on each part of the whole could be wildly different. One must not forget that markets are not a redistributive mechanism. Capital markets, from this point of view, reward the strong and penalise the weak.
LXIII This focus on the implementation of the CMU will surely bring about positive change and growth for EU capital markets. But its advantages must be accompanied by countervailing actions consistent with a federalist view of the European Union, namely in terms of economic policy, or funding, both directed towards supporting the member-states who might not reap the benefits of that activity (even if the investments return is made possible by economic activity within its borders).
Only if the circle is closed in this manner, so to say, will the existence of the CMU be translated into a smoothing of the effects of risk-sharing inside the EU.
Even if, with Brexit, most member-states operate in comparable financial systems (bank based, instead of market based as seemed to be the case in the UK), several conceptual and practical hurdles must still be overcome to achieve a CMU, such as eliminating the high level of segmentation in market agents; consolidating the information on transactions -and offers -at an European level, as well as issuer information (namely the debt they hold and ensuring that accounting and auditing standards are comparable within the EU); a single tax regime for capital movements, both for borrowers and issuers;
harmonising national level supervision practices; or preparing centralised infrastructures for disclosure of financial information, relevant facts for investors and also conflicts of interest that might exist.
Taking all this into consideration, if any doubts were to be had at this point, the prevalence of the CMU leaves no room for a notion other than that of a Federal European Union. Still, the path must be that of subsidiarity whenever possible, in assuring supervisory convergence and, step by step, making sure that the CMU builds enough improvement into the regulatory framework and its implementation by member states to, over time, fulfill the CMU's goal. Increasing capital markets' prevalence also means increasing the risk of those markets, a growth that must be met by adequate action by both regulators and supervising authorities.
Although it is clear that national level solutions cannot alone fulfill the aims of the CMU, LXIV the solution must not be to adhere to the other extreme -a European level exclusive status quo in terms of both regulation and supervision. 
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Nonetheless, Brexit brings the need to relocate the European Banking Authority and, with it, the temptation to prepare legislative reform that would involve a rearrangement of the three ESAs, placing all supervisory and regulatory powers at the EU level, hoping to overcome cross-border barriers by means of extensive harmonisation of rules and centralisation of supervision. Considering what has been written up to this point on the particularities of the CMU, this solution hardly seems a better option, and would undermine the steady progress of the initiative.
Looking at the current development of the CMU, the critique can be made that the initiative seems to be intent in creating the conditions for large financial institutions to further concentrate investment and expand their offer of products and services (Thomadakis 2017: 6) .
LXVI Still, if the overall result of the initiative proves to be increased transparency in capital markets, increasing accessibility to those markets by businesses, increasing market liquidity and the promotion and implementation of FinTech developments, LXVII the CMU will have greatly contributed to achieving freedom of capital within the EU's single market. And that is, in itself, of immense value for the future development of the EU under the auspices of a federal economic arrangement.
LXVIII
In closing, it must be mentioned that the Commission has already made staunch declarations on the need to accelerate the implementation of CMU, prioritising the harmonisation of insolvency law and supervisory matters. LXIX In particular, in the light of Brexit, the CMU presents an opportunity to determine whether or not supervisory competences are, in their current state, what they need to be, while, simultaneously, ensuring the enactment of several harmonisation movements that will reduce barriers to free movement of capital. Nonetheless, the completion of the CMU by 2019 seems to be a considerable challenge to meet. Perhaps, acknowledging this, the Commission's intention is to put into place the building blocks of the CMU by that date. LXX In fact, regulatory reform is but one of the first steps in achieving the CMU, only time will bring about the financial circuits, market conventions and technical infrastructures that take advantage of this revamped legal framework towards more efficient union-wide capital markets.
 Lawyer, PhD candidate at Universidade Nova de Lisboa. I Annex I of Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty provides us with the definitions encompassed within the expression "movements of capital". It can mean very different things, such as securities investment, financing, real estate investments or purchases. II The Treaty prohibits any restriction on capital movements and payments, both between Member States and between Member States and third countries. The principle was directly effective, i.e. it required no further legislation at either EU or Member States' level. III In general, a market can be defined as a mechanism through which buyers and sellers of a certain product meet to determine the price and quantity of that product (normally, by gauging offer and demand). In capital markets, lenders are met with borrowers (either by banks, dealers, money markets or investment funds). In this sense, lenders and borrowers, through their intermediaries, trade in risk and time. IV Capital markets, in the context of the Capital Markets Union, should be understood as shorthand for a long list of market segments and specifically excludes bank lending. V Free movement of capital is one of the freedoms the European Single Market presupposes. Considering capital markets in particular, one must mention the Financial Services Action Plan of 1999 [COM (99) XXVI Proposing a material change in the way that information is addressed within a prospectus, centering it on the existence of specific risks relevant to the investor. In fact, Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 establishes that the prospectus must only mention specific and material risk factors, makes it easier to incorporate information by reference (if it is already published elsewhere) and a shorter ("user-friendly") prospectus summary. Alongside a fast-track approval mechanism (Universal Registration Document), the Regulation demands the creation of a central prospectus database, where all prospectuses will be available for free. See also note xv. Many of these changes are directed at establishing easy disclosure rules so that more SME entities begin issuing financial instruments as a manner of financing. XXVII 
